લેણી રકમના દાવામાં વાદીએ રજુ કરેલા દસ્તાવેજી પુરાવાઓ જેવા કે, ઇન્વોઇસ અને ડીલીવરી ચલણો રજુ કરેલા, જેમાં પ્રતિવાદીનો સ્ટેમ્પ અને સાઈન આવેલ હતી. આ ડોક્યુમેન્ટોનો પ્રતિવાદી તરફે કોઈ ડીનાયલ કરવામાં આવેલ નહિ.
આમ, વાદી દ્વારા ડોક્યુમેન્ટ રજુ કરેલા જે એક્ઝીબિટ પડેલ તેથી વાદીનું પ્રાથમિક બર્ડન ઓંફ પ્રૂફ ડીસ્ચાર્જ થાય છે. જો પ્રતિવાદી તેને ડીનાયલ કરવા માંગે તો તેના વિરુદ્ધ ના પુરાવાઓથી રજુ કરી રીબુટ કરી શકે છે. પરંતુ પ્રતિવાદી તેમ કરવામાં નિષ્ફળ નીવડેલ, તેથી ટ્રાયલ કોર્ટ વાદી દ્વારા રજુ કરાયેલા પુરાવાઓ કે જેને એક્ઝીબીટ પડેલ છે. તેને માત્ર એવા કારણથી ઇગ્નોર ન કરી શકે કે, વાદીએ આ ડોક્યુમેન્ટોના સપોર્ટમાં કોઈ સાક્ષીઓ દ્વારા ઓરલ પુરાવો રજુ કરેલ નથી.
(પારા ૨૮,૨૯)

રીલેટેડ પેરેગ્રાફ :

28. To hold that a particular document is not admissible for proof of its contents unless the writer is called, is to denude the documentary evidence of all its value and is clearly contrary to certain express statutory provisions to be found in the Evidence Act, more particularly, Section 59 of the Evidence Act. In our opinion, the documentary evidence becomes meaningless if to prove it in every case by way of oral evidence of its contents. If that is the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate, the analysis of the evidence must be oral and that the oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognized by law, however, that is not the position under the Evidence Act. The definition of the term ‘evidence’ in Section 3 of the Evidence Act lays down that evidence means and includes statements made by the witnesses, which are called oral evidence, and documents produced before the court, which are called documentary evidence. A bare perusal of Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the ‘contents’ of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. Needless to say, that once the documents is proved in the manner provided under the provisions of the Evidence Act, the contents of that documents are also proved. It is for that reason that the Evidence Act advisedly lays down that the contents of a document can be proved by proving the document in the usual manner, a proposition that emerges unequivocally from a combined reading of Sections 59, 61 and 62 of that Act. Thus, according to us, the trial court should have believed the documents of invoices, such as invoices of the delivery chalan and ledger account, in absence of any dispute or rebuttal evidence submitted by the respondent-original defendant. Once the document has been exhibited, the initial burden of proof could be said to have been discharged by the original plaintiff. The original defendant was expected to deny the same with cogent rebuttal evidence, but having failed in submitting the rebuttal evidence, the trial court could not have ignored the exhibited evidence/undisputed evidence merely because there was no oral evidence in the form of examination of any evidence by the witness in support of the documentary evidence.

29. In our view, when the appellant-original plaintiff has produced the copies of the invoices and the delivery chalans duly stamped and signed by the respondent-defendant, more particularly, when there is no denial whatsoever on behalf of the respondent-original defendant, in view of Section 59 of the Act, 1872, the trial court should not have held that no oral evidence in the form of examining any evidence about the delivery of goods should have been made. When the initial burden of proof has been discharged by the plaintiff, it is for the respondent- defendant to rebut such evidence.