વાદીએ વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ સાથે રીતે નુકશાનીના વળતરની દાદ પણ માંગેલ તેથી નાણામાં ભરપાઈ કરી શકાય તેવું નુકશાન હોય આમ, વાદીનો પ્રાઈમાફેસી હોય તો પણ વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ મળી શકે નહિ
વાદીએ વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ સાથે રીતે નુકશાનીના વળતરની દાદ પણ માંગેલ તેથી નાણામાં ભરપાઈ કરી શકાય તેવું નુકશાન હોય આમ, વાદીનો પ્રાઈમાફેસી હોય તો પણ વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ મળી શકે નહિ
| SUPREME COURT | |
| Parties Name | M/s. Best Sellers Retail (India) Pvt. Ltd vs. M/s. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. and Ors |
| Judge Name | A. K. PATNAIK, and SWATANTER KUMAR |
| Date of Judgement | 8 – 059 – 2012 |
| Reference Link | AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 2448 |
| કેસની વિગત :
એજન્સી સાથેના કરાર પાલનના દાવામાં એજન્ટ દ્વારા કરારના અંત સુધી દાવાવાળી મિલ્કત જાળવી રાખવા અંગેનો કરારનો ભંગ થયેલ. તેથી વચગાળાના મનાઈ હુકમની માંગણીમાં પ્રતિવાદીને દાવાવાળી મિલ્કત ઉપર કબજો ન કરવાની માંગણી કરવામાં આવેલ તથા તેની સાથે વૈકલ્પિક રીતે નુકશાનીના વળતરની દાદ પણ માંગેલ. તેથી એવું કહી શકાય નહિ કે, વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ ન આપવામાં આવે તો વાદી ને નાણામાં ભરપાઈ ન કરી શકાય તેવું નુકશાન થાય તેમ છે. તેથી વાદીનો પ્રાઈમાફેસી હોય તો પણ વચગાળાનો મનાઈ હુકમ મળી શકે નહિ. (13, 17, 18) રીલેટેડ પેરેગ્રાફ : 13. On a reading of clause B-2 of the agreement, we find that Liberty Agencies had given a warranty that the suit schedule property was owned by it and that it will retain the possession of the suit schedule property until the expiry of the agreement. Clause D of the agreement clearly stipulated that the duration of the agreement shall be for a period of twelve years from the date of the agreement unless terminated in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Clause E-2 further provides that respondent No.1 and not Liberty Agencies could terminate the agreement by giving a notice of not less than three months after the end of six years from the date of the agreement and respondent No.1 had not terminated the agreement under this clause. Before the expiry of six years from the date of the agreement,Liberty Agencies sent the letter dated 26.02.2010 to the respondent No.1 committing a breach of clause B-2 of the agreement which provided that Liberty Agencies will retain possession of the suit schedule property until the expiry of the agreement. This was the breach of the agreement which was sought to be prevented by the trial court by an order of temporary injunction. The trial court and the High Court were thus right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 had a prima facie case. 17. Despite this claim towards damages made by the respondent No.1 in the plaint, the trial court has held that if the temporary injunction as sought for is not granted, Liberty Agencies may lease or sub-lease the suit schedule property or create third party interest over the same and in such an event, there will be multiplicity of proceedings and thereby the respondent No.1 will be put to hardship and mental agony, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Respondent No.1 is a limited company carrying on the business of readymade garments and we fail to appreciate what mental agony and hardship it will suffer except financial losses.The High Court has similarly held in the impugned judgment that if the premises is let out, the respondent No.1 will be put to hardship and the relief claimed would be frustrated and, therefore, it is proper to grant injunction and the trial court has rightly granted injunction restraining the partners of Liberty Agencies from alienating, leasing, sub-leasing or encumbering the property till the disposal of the suit.The High Court lost sight of the fact that if the temporary injunction restraining Liberty Agencies and its partners from allowing, leasing, sub-leasing or encumbering the suit schedule property was not granted, and the respondent No.1 ultimately succeeded in the suit, it would be entitled to damages claimed and proved before the court. In other words, the respondent No.1 will not suffer irreparable injury. To quote the words of Alderson, B. in The Attorney-General vs. Hallett [153 ER 1316: (1857) 16 M. and W.569]: “I take the meaning of irreparable injury to be that which, if not prevented by injunction, cannot be afterwards compensated by any decree which the Court can pronounce in the result of the cause.” 18. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order of temporary injunction passed by the trial court as well as the impugned judgment and the order dated 16.07.2010 of the High Court. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. |
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